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1. Why do prime ministers grow beards (if they happen to be men)
Imagine a regular prime minister – let’s call him Mr. J.T. – of a regular country in mid-March
2020. During a Council of Ministers on Friday afternoon, he needs to deliberate with the
ministers and make a decision from the three options, presented to him by the Ministry of Health
and the Ministry of Economy, after the best experts have been consulted:
-

-

Option 1) Introduce full lockdown: MH says with 80% probability this will save
1000 lives, ME says with 90% probability this will cost the country $ 1bln.
Option 2) Introduce “intelligent” lockdown: MH says with 90% probability this
will save 500 lives, ME says with 80% probability this will cost the country $
0.5bln.
Option 3) No lockdown: MH says with 85% probability this will save no lives,
ME says with 85% probability this will cost the country $ 0.2bln.

Forget for the time being option 3), it seems “suboptimal” here (think of Sweden, though). But
options 1) and 2) have very similar probability distributions and, crucially, each human life in
these scenarios costs the budget exactly $ 1mln. What shall J.T. do by the time of the scheduled
press conference? I would like to see Waleed Mebane’s approach to confidence in arguments in
dialogues for practical reasoning help us in such cases. Will it? For instance, how can a
quantified confidence in the premise “We gotta safe lives at any cost,” help us judging J.T.’s
conclusion to go for option 1) as rational or not?
This is a very well-written paper that shows the author’s competence in various streaks of
argumentation theory: from Rescher’s dialectic, to Bayesian models of argument strength, to
Toulmin’s warrants, to ethical and epistemic underpinnings of deliberative democracy, and more.
It’s an impressive paper that I have a suspicion is being readied for becoming a dissertation.
Given the occasion for which it is written and the obvious time and space limits involved,
however, the manuscript opens many rather fascinating lines of inquiry without quite closing
them.
Accordingly, my aim here is to give a number of constructive remarks that might inspire
Waleed to pick up the slack in some of his inquiries. I will go by a chronological order of his
exposition, although, as I do so, the importance of the challenge also piles up.
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2. Maximizing certainty?
Early in the paper Waleed claims the following: “One way of justifying a decision could be with
arguments for the claim that the decision is the best decision for the community with regard to
the issue of concern” (italics added). Going for the best decision – typically called optimizing or
maximizing – is no doubt “one way” of justifying one’s practical judgment. But there are other
ways (see Lewiński, 2017, 2018). One is satisficing, going for the good enough solution: “As
long as the budget doesn’t spend more than $ 2bln on fighting the epidemic, we’re good, sir!”
Such “local” satisfying might contribute to global, “all-things-considered” optimizing, thus
further complicating the decision model. Further, there are justifications by means of the
necessary measures: “We gotta safe lives at any cost, no matter what!” There are various types
of necessity (conceptual, de jure, practical), and one of them can be introduced via moral
imperatives, such as this one. Taking these other options for licensing practical inference into
account could significantly enrich Waleed’s approach – but will also make it much more
complicated! (I will return soon to the difficulty of defining “for the community” here.)
Further, the bestness of arguments is defined consistently with the overall focus on the
epistemic confidence in arguments: “if we have reduced the uncertainty as much as we could
have, then we can claim that our decision is rational on the grounds that we could not have done
better” (italics added). Is rationality, then, synonymous with approximating certainty? For the
traditionally dominant – formal, exact, static and sterile, but, frankly, boring – approach to
rationality, perhaps it is. All the same, rationality of decision making under uncertainty, even
deep uncertainty, is not only a booming area of philosophy, but also a necessary one, as reality
typically presents to us choices that are urgently necessary, while being deeply uncontrollable
and unpredictable. Sven Ove Hansson’s (2008) paper “From the casino to the jungle” very well
captures the sentiment here: most important real-life decisions cannot rely on the probability
calculus of the casino, but rather need to factor in the deep uncertainty of the jungle. Among the
sources of such “non-probabilistic uncertainty” are “unidentified consequences, undecided
values, unidentified options, undetermined demarcation of the decision, unclear connections with
later decision on the same subject-matter, and, unforeseeable dependence on decisions by others”
(Hansson & Hirsch Hadorn, 2016, pp. 16-17). Given the way reality is, we should not “reduce
the uncertainty as much as we can” if only because we simply cannot (“ought” presupposes
“can”). We should instead look for rational ways of handling uncertainty – for instance, via open
argumentative dialogues. Again, this is something Waleed’s proposal can be supplemented with.
3. What’s truth got do with it
Waleed entitled his paper “Confidence in Arguments in Dialogues for Practical Reasoning”.
These “dialogues” occur when “some small group” (I’ll return to it) “deliberates about what
actions to take” – which is in line with standard definitions of practical reasoning. However,
further in the paper Waleed speaks of “truth-seeking procedures” on the grounds that “getting at
the truth of some claim(s) will be considered an important purpose of the dialogue-type
examined here.” Maybe ambiguity clouds my understanding here but, given Toulmin’s
inspiration, if “some claims” include the “claim”, i.e., the conclusion of practical reasoning, I
have no idea how we can get at the truth of conclusions such as “So, let’s go for pizza then!” or
“So, you must all stay home for the next 14 days” other than doing the thing concluded.
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In his elaborate argument, supported mostly through the Bayesian approach to argument
strength, Waleed also gets to define the first concept of his title, confidence:
What we are looking for is a kind of prediction, a prediction of whether the argument will
turn out to have true premises and a robust warrant of inference. This prediction of the
truth-likeness of an argument, I propose to call ‘confidence’ rather than strength. With
the idea of a prediction, we can get close in defeasible argumentation to the notion of
‘strength’ we inherit from ordinary language. Unlike strength, our prediction is inherently
prone to change as new information comes in, but we will make it as stable as we can.
Again, there might be some ambiguity here due to the fact that Waleed is in effect defining a
meta-argumentative confidence here, so that I can for instance construct the following confident,
predictive argument: “I’m pretty sure J.T. will announce full lockdown, he’s got all the
arguments on the table, and I hear most of his senior advisers converge on this option.” But if
Waleed is discussing a ground-level concept here, he might just be blurring the difference
between truth-relevant theoretical reasoning and action-relevant practical reasoning. Prediction,
as a representative / assertive speech act can be true or false and, as such, is one possible
conclusion of theoretical reasoning. However, conclusions of practical reasoning are by no
means predictions: they are instead directive, commissive or declarative speech act such as
proposals, calls, or declarations. Typically, their chief propositional attitude is not composed of
truth-relevant beliefs, but instead of action-relevant intentions. (Of course, in the classic BDI
model of practical rationality, Beliefs play a key role as a link between our Desires-Goals and the
Intentions-Decisions: they select the appropriate means to our goals, thus constituting the meansgoals premise of practical argument; see Lewiński, 2017.)
One argument for keeping this distinction sharp is given in Searle’s (2001) treatise on
practical rationality, Rationality in Action, where he argues forcefully that the propositional
attitudes (or: “intentional states”) of desires and intentions have conditions of satisfaction
different from the propositional attitude of beliefs. Crucially, the former are voluntary and have a
world-to-mind direction of fit, while the latter is involuntary and has a mind-to-world direction
of fit. Further, desires might be inconsistent, while intentions characteristically involve gaps,
such as the one between the decision to act and actual action, as well as between the beginning of
an action and its completion. The consequence of all this is that “there is no deductive logic of
practical reason” (Searle, 2001, Ch. 8) comparable to the classic logic of theoretical reason, with
the principle of non-contradiction, formal deductive consequences, etc. This is something I think
Waleed could clarify better.
4. And rationality for all…
My final, but possibly most important question, regards the locus of rationality of the practical
arguments Waleed analyzes: whose rationality is his approach keeping in check? This is no
trivial question for argumentation theory. In Waleed’s work, we have concern for “the limits of
individual knowledge”; we have an attempt to model dialogues with “exactly two participants”
(proponent / opponent) and then with two participants and a judge / determiner; we have
aggregation of judgments of “multiple participants”, this including anything from “small groups”
to “crowds” with their own “wisdom.” All these loci of rationality have their rich intellectual
history. Bayes, especially on the dominant subjectivist interpretation of his theory of probability,
was primarily concerned with the individual beliefs of a single reasoner. Dialecticians since
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Socrates theorized dialogues as argumentative activities possibly surpassing some of the
individual limits, yet still dependent on the competence of at least one reasoner. Legal scholars
have based their specific approach to rationality on the idea that the expected inability and
unwillingness of the parties to legal proceedings to be beacons of impartial, quality reason can be
corrected by the procedural grip guaranteed by the third party (judge, jury). Mathematicians,
social scientists and philosophers – from Mandeville, to Condorcet, Simmel, Arrow, to
contemporary deliberative democrats – have continuously exposed fascinating challenges and
paradoxes of moving from individual rationality to group or “crowd wisdom”. The enfant
terrible of these discussions is of course Bernard Mandeville (1670 – 1733) who argued
provocatively that the roots of collective virtue lie inescapably in individual vices. Today, the
ideas of “Mandevillian intelligence” (Smart, 2018) have become an important area of
investigation in philosophy, cognitive science and computer science: self-interested, dogmatic or
forgetful arguers can produce argumentative discussions of very high quality whenever they
foster collective epistemic virtues such as cognitive diversity (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Smart,
2018). On the one hand, groups of otherwise critically minded and rational individuals end up
having woefully irrational discussions due to well-known group dynamics such as groupthink,
polarization, etc. (Sunstein, 2002). There is, in a word, no magic shortcut that would take us from
the individual to the collective rationality. Unfortunately, as our work with Mark Aakhus on
polylogues, argumentative discussions among many, has shown (Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014;
Lewiński, 2014, 2017) argumentation scholars all too often forget about it.
However, back to Waleed’s work. He very perspicuously identifies this problem – but
doesn’t quite draw its necessary consequences. He concludes his argument by referring to “a
competent and diverse group of dialogue participants” as a sine qua non condition for (practical?
See above) argumentative rationality. As just mentioned, this, at the risk of committing the
fallacy of composition / division, does not amount to having a “diverse group of competent
dialogue participants.” Once we agree on that, who is then to make the subjective quantified
probability calculations and for whom? In other words: who’s “preference base” do arguers argue
from in the practical dialogues Waleed projects? We have at least 6 options:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

The proponent’s
The opponent’s
The group’s composed of them two
The third party’s (arbiter / determiner)
The smaller collective’s they deliberate with
The bigger collective’s they deliberate for

Back to Mr. J.T. For him, being merely 40+ and healthy, the probability of suffering
serious COVID-19 related health consequences is somewhere in the range of suffering from a
falling roof tile. Rational conclusion for private him – e.g. drawn by applying Bayesian methods
– is then to continue business as usual: and this is what his GP might even advise him. However,
for his country’s head epidemiologist – thinking of the population at large – the rational course
of action for Mr. J.T. and his fellow citizens, young and old, is to stay home whenever possible,
wear a mask when out, and keep social distancing. And these are just two extreme options from
among many that his Council of Ministers needs to consider in their argumentative discussion
before the press conference.
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